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Abstract 
 
This is a speech given to the National Press Club, September 26, 2008 outlining the need 
for comprehensive reform of the electric power sector in the U.S. It outlines the centrality 
of the electricity sector to the economy and to any national energy and climate policies. 
The U.S. electric power sector is the last energy sector in the U.S. to be brought into the 
21st century with organization and regulatory governance institutions that are compatible 
with modern technology, future technological opportunities, reliability and environmental 
goals. The speech details the elements needed in a comprehensive national policy for the 
electric power sector. 
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Introduction 
 The U.S. electricity sector accounts for about 42% of the primary 
energy consumed in the U.S., 34% of the fossil fuels consumed in the U.S., 
and about 40% of U.S. CO2 emissions.  End-use consumption of electricity 
is growing faster than end-use consumption of both petroleum and natural 
gas. Accordingly, if you are interested in energy and climate policies the 
electricity sector is very important and will become even more important in 
the future.    
 Moreover, for those concerned with energy security, the electricity 
sector is a model of “energy independence.”  Electricity generation in the 
U.S. uses almost no petroleum, and petroleum’s share of electricity 
generation has fallen from 17% in 1973 to 1.5% in 2007.  Essentially all of 
the coal and natural gas used to generate electricity comes from North 
America and while a large share of the uranium used in nuclear power plants 
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is of foreign origin, the supply sources are diverse, the current supply mix 
heavily influenced by programs to reduce Russian stocks of highly enriched 
uranium, and uranium can be easily stockpiled.   
 Not surprisingly, policymakers are relying on the electricity sector to 
achieve a variety of goals: 
 1.  Providing an abundant and reliable supply of electricity produced 
efficiently to support a healthy growing economy.  Achieving this goal will 
require significant investments in new generation, transmission and 
distribution facilities.  The ability to mobilize the capital necessary to 
support the construction of these facilities is important.  It is also important 
that these investments take place without the huge cost overruns, and poor 
operating performance experienced by this sector from the mid-1960s into 
the early 1990s (when investment in new generating capacity by traditional 
regulated utilities came to a virtual halt) is not repeated in the next wave of 
investment in new generating facilities.   
 2.  Ensuring that electricity prices provide consumers with the price 
signals that will give them the incentives to use electricity wisely, to 
encourage adoption of more energy efficient technologies (e.g. lighting, 
HVAC, refrigeration, etc.), as well as to provide adequate revenues to 
stimulate efficient investment and operations. 
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 3.  To play a major, perhaps the major, role in meeting atmospheric 
GHG stabilization goals when the day comes that the U.S. adopts a national 
GHG mitigation policy (as well as other environmental goals e.g. for micro-
particulates, mercury emissions, and thermal discharge).  This will further 
increase capital investment requirements, increases the efficient investment 
and operating challenges, and the need to mitigate regulatory distortions that 
may undermine efficient responses to carbon prices.  Moreover, when GHG 
policies are adopted it is important that market or regulatory mechanisms  
work effectively to convey to consumers price signals that include the price 
placed on carbon dioxide emissions. 
 4.   To support continuing efforts to increase energy security and 
reliability by reducing the likelihood and costs of oil supply disruptions, as 
well as natural and unnatural events that may disable or destroy portions of 
the U.S. energy supply and delivery infrastructure.  (However, we should 
recognize that the electricity sector uses almost no oil. Policies to promote 
nuclear power, wind, etc. may make sense to mitigate CO2 emissions, but do 
not directly reduce U.S. oil imports.) 
 These are fine goals.  However, I do not believe that the electricity 
sector is presently up to achieving them quickly or efficiently from an 
organizational, financial or regulatory perspective.  Unlike every other 
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energy sector, the electricity sector lacks a comprehensive national policy 
framework consistent with achieving these goals.  In the last 25 years we 
have adopted national industry restructuring, regulatory reform policies, and 
competition policies for all of the other energy sectors.  We have done so as 
well for almost every other major infrastructure sector: railroads, trucking, 
airlines, telecommunications, etc.  The electricity sector, however, is stuck 
somewhere between the policy framework of 1935 and the vision for 
restructuring, competition and regulatory reform that emerged in the U.S. 
and a number of other countries in the late 1990s.  Without a modern 
comprehensive national electricity sector organization, regulatory and 
competition policy framework for the electricity sector, we will not achieve 
the goals that I discussed above. 
 
Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform 
 In every other energy sector, the U.S. has implemented fairly clear 
and comprehensive national policy and regulatory frameworks to achieve 
reasonably well articulated goals and has then allowed the industrial 
organization of these sectors to adjust naturally to the incentives that these 
framework create.  In the energy sectors and other infrastructure sector the 
reform themes over the last 25 years have been similar: (a) industry 
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restructuring to separate potential competitive from natural monopoly 
segments, (b) the promotion of competition in those sectors where effective 
competition is likely to be feasible, and (c) the introduction of regulatory 
reforms to make regulation more effective for those segments where it is not.  
Let’s look at the natural gas sector as an example: 
The natural gas industry, which in principle has many structural 
features similar to the electric power sector, faced serious shortages during 
the 1970s and early 1980s due to a failed regulatory system that constrained 
natural gas prices below their market clearing levels combined with an 
incompatible mix of federal and state regulation that made the social cost of 
the resulting shortages even worse.  This situation is nicely documented in 
the work of my colleagues Paul MacAvoy and Bob Pindyck who 
campaigned during the 1970s for natural gas field price deregulation so that 
prices could rise to market clearing levels.   
Field prices of natural gas were ultimately deregulated and a 
comprehensive restructuring process for the natural gas industry was 
initiated and completed by the federal government during the 1980s and 
1990s.  The federal restructuring process covered natural gas production, 
interstate pipeline transportation, marketing, and the interstate storage 
segments of this industry. 
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We now have a well integrated competitive North American market 
for natural gas that moves gas economically and reliably long distances (e.g. 
from Alberta to NYC). The sector responds smoothly to supply shocks, even 
those as extreme as hurricane Katrina.  During the reform process and 
natural gas prices went up, then they went down, and then they went up 
again in response to changing supply and demand conditions.  Domestic 
natural gas production is increasing again today in response to higher prices. 
Substantial investments are being made in new pipeline projects to move gas 
from new areas where production is growing to the markets where it is 
consumed. The terms and condition for service on these pipeline projects is 
subject to light-handed federal regulation.    
Judging whether natural gas restructuring and regulatory reform was a 
good idea or a bad idea based on whether prices are higher or lower than an 
estimate of what a regulated prices would have been is not the proper way to 
evaluate the social welfare consequences of such reforms.  Regulated prices 
can be too high or too low and are only right by accident.  One must look 
instead at the efficiency changes on the supply and demand sides of the 
natural gas sector to properly assess whether it has been successful or not.  
Indeed, it is widely believed that the reforms of the natural gas sector have 
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been very successful, despite the fact that natural gas prices are much higher 
today than were in the 1990s when the reforms were largely completed. 
 Going beyond energy, I note as well that the restructuring, regulatory 
reform and competition reforms applied to the railroad, trucking, airline, 
cable television, telecommunications, etc., sectors, all involved aggressive 
federal initiatives that often reduced state regulatory jurisdiction and were 
actively opposed by many state regulators and various interest groups. 
Overall, the dominant political force in the energy and infrastructure 
restructuring  programs of the last 25 years has been federal government 
action rather than state government initiatives.  Indeed, the states have often 
opposed these reforms. 
 And then we have the electric power sector, the last reform holdout.  
For almost 50 years this sector was stuck in an organizational and regulatory 
framework that may have been well matched to the electricity generation 
and transmission technology available in 1935, but was surely poorly 
matched to changes in technology, new technological opportunities, 
contemporary investment needs, or current economic and environmental 
challenges.  Then in the early 1980s, electricity sector reformers began to 
stir, responding to concerns about the system of regulated vertically 
integrated monopolies inherited from the 1930s. The “good old days” of 
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regulation represent a view to the past with rose colored glasses.  The system 
of regulated vertically integrated monopoly was plagued by cost overruns 
associated with nuclear power plants, poor operating performance for both 
nuclear and large fossil-fueled plants, poor fuel procurement decisions,  
wide price differences between neighboring areas, excess generating 
capacity, inefficient dispatch and economy energy trading between 
generating companies, regulatory incentives to keep old inefficient plants 
operating rather than retiring them, too many small utilities to take 
advantage of economies of scale, institutional and technological barriers to 
using the transmission network to access lower cost power, productivity 
lags, and inefficient retail prices.  The system “worked” in the sense that 
supply and demand were balanced and the system was quite reliable (though 
the Northeast blackout and summer brown-outs in New York City during the 
1960s are hard to forget).  But it was unnecessarily costly and inefficient.   
  Reformers looked to the favorable experience with restructuring, 
competition, and regulatory reform in other sectors and with electricity in 
other countries to help to solve the problems associated with the fragmented 
electric power sector made up of over 100 vertically integrated geographic 
monopolies. Municipal distribution companies and large industrial 
customers were especially aggressive at promoting reforms focused on open 
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transmission access, the creation of transparent organized regional 
competitive wholesale markets, and (in the case of large industrial 
customers) retail competition.     
A large number of states initially embraced this restructuring,  
competition, and regulatory reform vision and began to implement it.  In 
2000 it looked like restructuring and competitive market reforms were going 
to sweep the U.S. electric power industry.   
 Then came the California electricity crisis, the collapse of Enron and a 
number of merchant generating companies, increased volatility to natural 
gas markets and associated volatility in wholesale electricity market prices, 
and a long march upward in fossil fuel prices ultimately resulting in rising 
retail electricity prices in both regulated and restructured states.  Most of the 
states that were leaders in restructuring during the late 1990s, when natural 
gas prices were low and there was excess capacity, initiated reforms during a 
period when regulated prices for generation service were expected to be 
much higher than perceived comparable competitive wholesale market 
prices.  The expectation was that over time retail prices would fall.  This 
forecast was based on the assumption that low prices for natural gas in 
particular would continue and that a new system built on efficient CCGT 
technology would evolve.  At that time, a major “problem” that many of 
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these states had to cope with were the “stranded generation costs,” primarily 
associated with what were perceived to be costly nuclear power plants, that 
were expected to result from the introduction of real wholesale and retail 
competition.  This was expected to be a “transition problem” because it was 
expected that competition would result in market prices that would fall to 
levels below the embedded costs of nuclear plants and older fossil plants that 
would have otherwise been used to calculated (higher) regulated retail 
prices. 
  However, as natural gas and coal prices continued to rise far above 
anyone’s expectations, many of these states soon found that competitive 
market prices were rising dramatically along with natural gas prices (which 
affect competitive wholesale electricity prices in most regions of the 
country) --- arguably rising to levels above what regulated prices would have 
been today under the status quo ante (though this requires a difficult 
counterfactual analysis).  This, of course does not mean that these electricity 
sector reforms were a failure.  In states that adopted the restructuring, 
wholesale and retail competition model, retail prices now reflect marginal 
supply costs, as they should to give consumers the right price signals to use 
electricity wisely.  Rather it means that regulated prices are or would have 
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been too low to give consumers appropriate incentives to make wise 
consumption decisions.   
In evaluating restructuring, competition and regulatory reform one 
must understand all of its efficiency and distributional properties, not just at 
short run price effects.  From an efficiency perspective, the restructuring 
reforms implemented at the federal level and in some states have led to 
numerous cost reducing successes in the face of rising fossil fuel prices.  
These include dramatic improvements in the performance of divested 
nuclear plants, significant improvements in the performance of fossil plants 
that now face market incentives, roughly 200,000 GW of new (mostly 
merchant) gas-fired generation has been added to the system between 1999 
and 2004, while the risk of cost overruns, fuel price fluctuations, demand 
variations, and availability problems experienced by some of these plants 
were shifted to their owners through the market rather than borne by 
consumers through cost-of-service regulation.  There is good empirical 
evidence that the expansion of the boundaries of RTOs (e.g. PJM) have led 
to significant changes in power flows and more efficient dispatch of power 
plants, while inefficiencies are observed at the boundaries of RTOs that have 
not agreed to be consolidated (e.g. NY/NE).  Gradual improvements in 
wholesale market designs have increased the efficiency of these markets and 
 12
have restored investment incentives.  Moreover, retail prices now respond 
quickly to changes in wholesale market prices, providing consumers with the 
right price signals rather than the wrong price signals resulting from retail 
price regulation.  And these price signals are properly differentiated by time 
and location to reflect marginal supply costs, rather than the depreciated 
original cost of generating plants built 50 years ago.  Demand management 
programs linked to short-term supply and demand conditions are expanding 
quickly as well in the reform regions.  
Of course, the full reform program has not been implemented in large 
areas of the South, the West, and portions of the Midwest.  The partial 
electricity reform equilibrium that we appear to be in now will not serve the 
country well and is potentially quite unstable.  We have a system that is 1/3 
reformed and 2/3 stuck in the structural and regulatory paradigm of the 
1935s or somewhere in between. 
The problems created by an antiquated industry structure and 
incompatible mix of state and federal regulation have not gone away.  They 
are lurking out there to undermine achieving the goals that I enumerated 
earlier.   Absent a comprehensive national electricity policy framework this 
sector is and will perform poorly in meeting the four sets of goals that I 
discussed earlier. 
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The Climate Change Policy Challenge 
 The purpose of this talk is not to discuss climate change policy.  
However, I will use it to illustrate how the current national policy vacuum 
affecting the electric power sector will undermine efficient climate change 
policies. 
 When the U.S. adopts a serious policy to constrain CO2 emissions, 
and I think it is a question of when and how, not whether, the electric power 
sector will be a central target of the associated policy initiatives.  The sector 
produces 40% of U.S. CO2 emissions and it is generally believed that the 
most economical opportunities to reduce CO2 emissions in the U.S. are on 
the supply and demand sides of the electricity sector. 
 As a practical matter it is almost a certainty that the U.S. will adopt a 
cap and trade program rather than an emissions tax.  In this case, many 
economists have argued that all allowances should be auctioned because, 
they say, giving emissions allowances away for free to electricity generators, 
will result in windfall profits for generating facilities and because the auction 
revenues can be used to cut “bad taxes.”  There is a good case for auctioning 
allowances, but the first argument for doing so flows from reasoning based 
on the assumption that the generation segment of this industry is competitive 
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rather than regulated.  However, a large fraction of the CO2 emissions in the 
electric power sector come from power plants owned by traditional regulated 
vertically integrated utilities and are regulated based on traditional cost of 
service principles. 
 When emissions allowances are given away for free to regulated 
utilities their cost --- zero --- will be passed through in retail prices so that 
the primary beneficiary of free CO2 allowances is given to consumers rather 
than to the utilities. The problem here is not “windfall profits” for generators 
in states with cost of service regulation, but rather that in regulated 
jurisdictions retail prices will be too low, failing properly to reflect the 
marginal social cost of electricity production, discouraging conservation and 
investments by consumers in energy efficiency.   
On the other hand, in jurisdictions with wholesale and retail 
competition, the price of emission allowances will be reflected in both 
wholesale and retail prices whether or not they are given away for free.  This 
creates inequities between consumers in different states, complicates 
implementing a national CO2 policy, and further undermines our ability to 
sustain competition in those states that have chosen to adopt a competitive 
market framework. 
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 Almost every model that examines the efficient responses in the 
electricity sector to carbon prices set to achieve specific atmospheric GHG 
stabilization goals efficiently yields similar results.  On the demand side 
there are relatively low cost ways to reduce electricity consumption by 
increasing energy efficiency in building, lighting, HVAC and other 
equipment.  That’s why getting the retail price signals right is important and 
why muting them with regulation based on traditional cost of service models 
is inconsistent with promoting adoption of economical energy efficiency 
opportunities.  Auctioning allowances to regulated generators will partially 
compensate for the inefficiencies of regulated prices in the states that have 
not deregulated generation since the market value of these allowances will 
then be passed through to electricity consumers.  That’s a better argument 
for auctioning allowances than concerns about windfall profits and the 
dream of replacing bad taxes with good taxes.  It is likely, however, that a 
large fraction of the allowances will be allocated free and, absent appropriate 
policies for distributing the “rents” associated with the free allowances,  
regulated retail prices will, as a result, be too low. 
 Second, the GHG mitigation models typically spit out significant 
investments in nuclear power plants, carbon capture and storage facilities, 
and renewable energy.   Can we avoid the cost overruns and inefficiencies 
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that were experienced under regulation during the last wave of investment as 
regulated utilities begin to build power plants again?  I see little evidence 
that the states that have stuck with regulation have implemented available 
incentive regulation mechanisms.  Moreover, traditional vertically integrated 
utilities no longer have any experience managing large construction projects.  
Most traditional vertically integrated utilities have not built major generation 
projects for 15 years or more.  Whatever expertise they may have once had 
in managing major generation construction projects is gone.  This increases 
the likelihood that absent appropriate incentives to control costs, regulated 
generation projects will be excessively costly and that the cost overruns will 
be largely borne by consumers.   
 In the other hand, in the states that have implemented competitive 
generation market models, cost and performance risks are shifted to 
investors from consumers, properly aligning construction and operating 
efficiency incentives.  
 Let me turn to renewable energy as another example of why the 
current system is poorly adapted to respond efficiently to GHG mitigation 
goals as they are reflected in policies to promote renewable energy.  The 
most efficient sites for renewable energy facilities, especially wind and large 
scale solar facilities, are often located far from load centers --- on shore and 
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off-shore.  To take advantage of these opportunities very significant 
investments in new long-distance transmission facilities will be required.  
The organizational and regulatory framework that presently governs much of 
the U.S. electric power sector is not conducive to supporting these 
transmission investments.  If remote sources of renewable energy are not 
available to meet state or potential future federal renewable energy portfolio 
standards or to respond to the incentives provided by CO2 emissions prices, 
CO2 mitigation goals will be even more costly to achieve. 
 
What is to be done? 
 We need to stop dealing with the electric power sector by placing 
band aids on the Federal Power Act of 1935.  We need a comprehensive 
national policy for the electric power sector --- a Federal Power Act of 2009 
to replace the Federal Power Act of 1935.  A policy that respects legitimate 
state rights but also reflects the contemporary attributes of electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution technologies, opportunities for 
innovation, and the public policy demands that are or will be placed on the 
electric power sector.  While, I recognize that there are many technical 
differences between them, the restructuring of the U.S. natural gas industry 
provides a very successful basic organizational model to start with for the 
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electric power industry.  The special attributes of electricity and electricity 
networks can be layered on top of this model. 
 What provisions might a Federal Power Act of 2009 contain? 
 1.  The economic, planning, reliability, and siting review and 
regulation of high voltage transmission facilities with voltages above, let’s 
say, 69 kv, should be federalized and the prices for transmission service over 
this network fully unbundled from generation and distribution service and 
made transparent.  This would follow the structural and regulatory reform 
model associated with interstate pipeline transportation of natural gas and 
the successful implementation of electricity sector reform models introduced 
in other countries.  Recent federal legislation effectively “federalized” 
reliability rules and made them mandatory.  This is a step in the right 
direction.   
 2.  The key provisions of FERC Order 2000 should be put into law.  
This would require the creation of RTOs that manage the operation of large 
regional transmission networks, implement FERC’s transmission access, 
pricing, and planning regulations, and operate voluntary wholesale markets 
for electric energy, ancillary services, capacity and transmission rights.  
There is abundant evidence (a) that RTOs are needed to support efficient 
competitive markets, (b) that expanding the geographic expanse of RTOs 
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and improving the market designs for energy, ancillary services and capacity 
lead to efficiency improvements, (c) and that wholesale market designs built 
around what is generally referred to as the “standard market design,” 
augmented by capacity obligations and capacity markets, promote economic 
efficiency. 
 3.  Vertically integrated utilities should be required to unbundle 
generation service from distribution service so that their respective costs or 
prices are transparent. They should also be required at least to move their 
generation facilities to a separate generation affiliate. Existing cost-of-
service arrangements governing existing generating capacity can be 
replicated through properly structure long-term wholesale contracts between 
distribution and generation affiliates that are regulated by FERC.  This will 
preserve the imbedded economic benefits (or costs) of existing generating 
capacity for retail consumers.  These contracts would be transparent 
wholesale power contracts and regulated by the FERC.    
4.  The states would be free to decide whether or not they wanted to 
introduce retail competition for some or all customer classes.  Where 
distribution companies continue to have obligations to serve retail customers 
at regulated retail prices, however, they would be required to meet at least 
their incremental power supply needs through competitive wholesale market 
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solicitations managed by the states using procurement mechanisms that meet 
reasonably flexible FERC competitive procurement criteria.  In states that 
have already restructured and adopted a competitive wholesale market 
model, all default retail supply obligations would be met through approved 
competitive procurement programs. 
 5. Any federal loan guarantees available for financing nuclear, CCS, 
or renewable generation would be available only for “merchant” generating 
facilities and not to facilities subject to traditional cost-of-service regulation.  
Generators should get loan guarantees only once.  Regulated generators can 
effectively get loan guarantees through cost of service regulation.  Merchant 
generators can get similar financing relief from federal loan guarantees.  
This would roughly place regulated and merchant generation investment 
options on a level playing field. 
 6.  Any free CO2 allowances allocated to the electric power sector 
should go directly to electricity consumers through non-distortionary lump-
sum distributions based on, say, historical consumption in a base period.  All 
generators that emit CO2 would be required to buy allowances in the market 
to cover their emissions.  Generators subject to cost-of-service arrangements 
would be allowed to pass the associated costs through the retail price 
regulatory process and they would be reflected in retail prices.  Consumers 
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would get a lump sum “dividend” on their bills each month for the value of 
the allowances allocated to them. That is, consumers would face the efficient 
retail price on the margin, while receiving a dividend that would not depend 
on whether their consumption increases or decreases, but would lower their 
total bills.  This would then provide better retail price signals on the margin 
where it matters for stimulating wise consumption decisions. 
 7.  State regulatory jurisdiction and regulation would continue over 
distribution facilities, sub-transmission facilities below 69 say kv, whether 
and how retail competition will be permitted, energy efficiency programs, 
and competitive procurement of generation consistent with FERC 
procurement criteria.  This is no different from the states’ jurisdiction in the 
natural gas industry. 
 
Conclusion 
 The U.S. electric power sector is the last energy sector in the U.S. to 
be brought into the 21st century with organization and regulatory governance 
institutions that are compatible with modern technology, future 
technological opportunities, reliability and environmental goals.  It would be 
nice if both presidential candidates would articulate their visions for this 
important sector that goes beyond sound bites about nuclear power, 
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renewable energy, energy security, and energy efficiency.  It will take 
significant political courage to design and implement a comprehensive 
electricity sector reform program because there are powerful interest groups 
that benefit from the status quo.  As they say, however, you can’t make a 
good omelet without breaking some eggs and then using the right recipe.  
We know what eggs need to be broken and we now have a good recipe for 
turning them into an omelet.  What we lack is the national leadership to 
make the omelet.    
